Briefing

The new Silk Road for commodities: Is de‑dollarisation how we get there?

The assumption that commodities will be priced in US dollars has not been significantly challenged in the last 80 years. China has long been arguing that the commodities, for which it is the largest consumer, should be priced in RMB. It has progressively expanded offshore access to its commodity futures markets such that, today, it is possible to trade 91 Chinese exchange-traded commodity products from over 30 countries.

In this paper, we explore the factors that could weaken the dollar’s dominance in commodity pricing and support a shift towards a multipolar currency landscape, especially in light of recent geopolitical developments.

Introduction

Historically, the Silk Road was the route for commodities to flow from China to the West and vice versa. Today, China is by far, the largest consumer of commodities in the world. For example, its imports in 2024, in terms of global share, reflect approximately 70% of iron-ore, 60% of soybeans and 23% of crude oil. The quantity of certain physical commodities flowing into China means that it should be the global price setter for those commodities.

However, ever since the effective creation of the Petrodollar System¹ in 1974, not only oil and petroleum derived products but most other commodities have been priced in United States dollars (USD). As the largest traded commodity in the world, the Petrodollar System ensured a natural demand for USD by all countries. The existence of deep and liquid commodity futures markets in the US ensured that USD denominated commodity futures determined the price not just for oil but for other commodities too. Today’s industry benchmark prices for precious metals, natural gas, LNG, base metals, ferrous metals, agricultural commodities etc. are all priced in USD even when traded on futures exchanges outside the US. For example, the Singapore benchmark iron ore futures contract on the Singapore Exchange is priced in USD.²

To change the narrative of being the ‘price taker’ rather than the ‘price maker’, there have been a number of attempts by China to establish its own international benchmark prices in renminbi (RMB). These domestic benchmarks have been made accessible to international investors to help China internationalise the RMB. Examples include the iron ore futures price on the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE), the crude oil futures price on the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE) and the gold futures price on the Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE). China’s benchmark prices have no doubt been successful in that they represent the benchmark price of those commodities in the PRC domestic markets and have traded with significant liquidity on the commodity futures exchanges listing them. However, they are mostly seen as indicators of domestic prices and not, therefore, a true measure of international pricing. Much of the futures liquidity in Chinese futures products comes from domestic trading which is often considered mostly speculative rather than reflective of ‘real-world’ demand.

This, therefore, begs the question, how realistic is it that international commodities will be priced in RMB as an alternative to USD? Put another way, will China’s efforts to internationalise commodity pricing in RMB succeed?

In this paper, we explore the above by reference to recent developments in China.

The genesis of the Chinese internationalisation of their commodity prices

Until the mid-2010s, foreign entities wishing to access Chinese commodity exchanges could only do so through locally incorporated China entities. However, since 2017, new routes to access these derivatives markets have progressively emerged. Given its capital control regime, it is common for China to take a cautious approach when allowing cross-border access to its commodity exchanges.

Depending on the policy support for the commodity type, there are two main routes to gain exposure to commodity prices in China and repatriate profits and margin collateral in respect of traded activity. In this paper, we refer to these offshore routes to access Chinese commodity products and prices as the ‘new Silk Road’.

It is worth recognising that, notionally, all commodity futures contracts in China are physically-settled contracts. In practice, few do physically so settle. There are exceptions, such as with the INE’s crude oil contract and SHFE’s alumina futures contract but which rarely settle physically.

Therefore, for the most part, Chinese commodity futures are essentially about hedging, speculation or arbitrage.

The Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) where direct offshore access to physical trading of gold is permitted in China via the international board of the SGE (i.e. the SGEI) is not a futures market but does involve actual physical settlement. Although most other countries regulate gold the same as any other commodity, in China, gold is regulated as a currency³. This means that, besides spot contracts in precious metals, although there are certain forward products traded on the SGEI, these are not regulated as commodity futures products.

“The existence of deep and liquid commodity futures markets in the US ensured that USD denominated commodity futures determined the price not just for oil but for other commodities too.”

Accessing the new Silk Road

There are broadly two ways in which offshore access to Chinese commodity futures can be achieved by investors. These two routes are through the offshore commodity futures markets access route (Overseas Participant Route) and the Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI) Scheme. We discuss these routes below.

Overseas Participant Route

The key distinction between the SGEI route and the offshore futures markets access route is that, for the former, participation and access require direct membership of the SGEI by the investor whereas, the latter does not require the investor to be a member of the futures exchange in order to trade its products. As we discuss below, these can be accessed from offshore and through an intermediary Chinese broker.

Although the suggestions of offshore access to China’s commodity futures markets first emerged in 2014 with the launch of the INE as a fully owned subsidiary of SHFE, the establishment of actual offshore trading access didn’t commence until 2018 after the INE launched its first futures contact, the medium sour crude oil contract. Since the success of its first product, the INE has listed four 4 more futures contacts, including a bonded copper (BC Copper) futures contract that mirrors the successful SHFE copper futures contract.

In terms of the regulatory framework to enable offshore access to China’s commodity futures markets, this was formalized through the Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commissions’ (CSRC‘s) ‘Interim Measures for the Administration of Domestic Futures Trading of Specific Varieties by Overseas Traders and Overseas Brokerage Institutions’⁴. The key benefit of this regulatory change was to create an exception to China’s capital markets restrictions that would otherwise block profit repatriation. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) regulations therefore now, allow offshore participants to repatriate profits via designated intermediaries.

However, the approach of setting up a dedicated exchange for futures contracts that are accessible to only overseas investors, as adopted by the INE, is not the only way that China has internationalised its commodity futures products. For example, it is possible for offshore investors to trade certain commodity futures contracts like the iron-ore futures contract listed on the DCE, the lithium carbonate futures contract on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange (GFEX) and the Purified Terephthalic Acid (PTA) futures contract on Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (ZCE). Neither the DCE, GFEX nor ZCE were required to set up a separate futures exchange just to enable offshore participants to trade certain commodity futures contracts.

These differences between offshore access approaches, adopted by these commodity futures exchanges, represent China’s conscious policy choice in experimenting with different routes for liberalisation of their commodity markets. This means that a discussion on offshore access routes into China’s commodity futures markets, leads to different structural routes depending on the relevant futures exchange.

Effective 8 August 2025, SHFE introduced significant structural changes to its rules to accommodate broader participation by offshore participants. The objective is to integrate overseas special participants (OSPs), overseas intermediaries, and overseas clients (hereafter together, Overseas Participants), into the full spectrum of SHFE’s futures trading processes.

To enable this, SHFE has revised 35 secondary business and 19 product specific futures rules with the ‘Overseas Special Participants Management Rules of the Shanghai Futures Exchange’ as the cornerstone of these rules. Other relevant rule amendments apply to its Membership Management Rules, Trading Rules and Clearing Rules. These revised rules systematically outline the conditions, rights, and obligations for Overseas Participants engaging in domestic futures trading.

The significance of these changes depends on whether the Overseas Participant is looking to provide brokerage services to its overseas clients or whether such Overseas Participant is looking to directly trade on SHFE (e.g. as commodities trading houses might).

In order to discuss the OSP routes, it is necessary to acknowledge the roles played by (a) PRC Futures Brokers (equivalent to clearing members in the context of an international futures exchange) who are regulated Chinese entities and SHFE members, serving as primary conduits for market access, and (b) overseas intermediaries (OI‘s) who are overseas brokers (equivalent to introducing brokers in the context of an international futures exchange) who do not trade directly on SHFE but authorize Chinese Futures Brokers to execute trades and clear transactions.

Under the new SHFE rules, OSPs are either classified as (a) Overseas Special Brokerage Participants (OSBPs), who can accept orders from overseas clients and OIs, and (b) Overseas Special Non-Brokerage Participants (OSNBPs), who trade on their own account. In short, an OSBP is closer to an offshore executing broker than an OI previously was, and an OSNBP gives an offshore trader the ability to trade directly on SHFE (without becoming a SHFE member) and clear through a PRC Futures Broker. See the summary table below on some of the different features of each of the above participants.

Feature	Overseas Intermediary	OSBP	OSNBP
Direct SHFE market access	❌ No – relies on a PRC Futures Broker or OSBP	✔️ Yes – can trade directly on behalf of clients (i.e. as agent)	✔️ Yes – can trade directly as principal
Trading capability	Indirectly through PRC Futures Broker or OSBP	Intermediation on behalf of its customers only	Directly for its own account only
Clearing and settlement	Via PRC Futures Broker or OSBP	Via PRC Futures Broker	Via PRC Futures Broker
Access to trading facilities	❌No	✔️ Yes – full access	✔️ Yes – full access
Appeals and contractual rights	–	✔️ Yes	✔️ Yes

Qualified Foreign Investor (QFI) Scheme

Originally introduced in 2002 to provide access to foreign investors to China’s capital markets using foreign currency converted into RMB, the then subsisting Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program was complemented by the RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor(RQFII) in 2011 to allow foreign investors to use offshore RMB to invest directly in China’s securities markets. Following the merger of the two programmes in 2020 to create the new Qualified Foreign Investor (New QFI) route that overhauled a number of the criteria for participation and removed quota limits, the more relevant development for commodity market participants happened in 2021.⁵

After 1 November 2021, the New QFI enabled qualified investors (QFIs) to access commodity futures, commodity options and stock index options listed and traded on futures trading venues approved by the State Council or the CSRC.⁶ New QFI eligibility extended to commodity futures and options across major exchanges including INE, DCE, ZCE and SHFE, providing an alternative to the Overseas Participant route.

Further expansions⁷ in 2025 added commodities like steel rebar, fuel oil, and natural rubber, enhancing the scheme’s scope. In 2021, 41 exchange-traded commodity products were accessible under the New QFI. As of 2025, 91 exchange-traded commodity products are accessible. This increase of 50 new products in four years, reflects China’s interest in attracting foreign investment together with its growing confidence in managing the additional trading exposure that would follow from increased openness.

As of August 2025, there are 907 QFIs⁸ of which, around 40 are commodity trading firms. The New QFI route now enables commodity traders with exposure to Chinese commodity futures prices to manage that risk without having to set up a local entity as well as allowing true arbitrage opportunities for market participants who wish to trade the spreads between different futures prices. The table below highlights some of the most obvious spread-trade opportunities that are available to market participants, with the benefit now of the derivative position being capable of being located within the same trading entity, thereby allowing true netting of positions.

Commodity for Arbitrage	PRC Futures Product	Non-PRC Futures Product
Iron Ore	Dalian Iron Ore Futures Contract	SGX MB Iron Ore CFR China (58% FE Fines) Index Futures Contract
Copper⁹	SHFE Copper Cathode Futures Contract	LME Copper Three-Month (3M) Futures Contract
Gold	SHFE Gold Futures Contract	CME COMEX Gold (GC) Futures Contract
Soybean	DCE Soybean No. 1 Futures Contract	CME CBOT Soybean Futures Contract

The full list of commodity futures contracts that can be accessed via the New QFI route is set out in the table at the end of this paper.

Overseas Participants route vs New QFI – what are the differences?

Access to commodity products

As the table at the end of this paper highlights, the New QFI route gives access to more commodity products at present, but as the SHFE list shows, once the DCE, ZCE and GFEX are given the approvals that the CSRC has given the SHFE and the INE, it is possible that additional products will be accessible from offshore under the Overseas Participant Route. Although the timing of that expanded access to DCE, ZCE and GFEX cannot be determined, the rapid pace of internationalisation of the New QFI and SHFE suggests that it won’t be very long.

Delivery differences

One of the limitations of the New QFI is that QFIs cannot participate in the physical delivery of commodity futures. This is due to the fact that they cannot receive and issue Value Added Tax (VAT) invoices. If physical delivery is the objective, then the Overseas Participant route is more suitable. However, as highlighted above, other than the INE’s crude oil contract and SHFE’s alumina futures contract, few futures contracts physically settle.

The OSP framework is distinctive because it enables physical delivery through bonded facilities. Under this mechanism, contracts are settled by transferring bonded warrants within customs‑supervised zones, without the goods entering the domestic market. Title passes via deliver of warrants, while the goods remain in bonded storage. Commodities held in bonded storage only trigger VAT and import duties once they are ‘released for use’ inside China. The warrant holder can transfer or sell the warrant, use it as collateral or eventually clear the goods into the domestic market by completing customs procedures and paying the relevant VAT and import duties.

The main barrier to using non‑bonded (duty‑paid) facilities is the strict VAT invoicing requirement. Under PRC VAT laws, non‑bonded deliveries are domestic transactions and must be accompanied by a specialized VAT invoice. The VAT invoice allows tax payers to claim the import VAT as input VAT in circumstances where the commodities are used in taxable operations. OSPs, as offshore entities without domestic tax registration, cannot issue these invoices, making non‑bonded delivery commercially unviable because end-user buyers would be unable to recover the VAT. Bonded deliveries are not an issue if the objective of the delivery is transhipment, breaking bulk and inventory storage for regional (non-China) distribution, procession or blending prior to re-export etc. Because OSP users will deliver on a bonded basis, i.e. deliveries occur at a ‘net price’ that excludes domestic VAT and duties.

Capital control and currency considerations

Both QFIs and OSPs who remit foreign currency into China are permitted to repatriate their investment principal and income in either foreign currency or RMB. However, where funds are originally remitted in RMB, they must be repatriated in RMB.

There are slightly different account rules and protocols that each of QFIs and OSPs must follow in order to facilitate that remittance. These differences are primarily related to the different legal frameworks that support the two different routes.

RMB is the base currency for daily clearing and settlement on the PRC commodity futures exchanges. Daily mark‑to‑market losses, fees, and other charges must therefore be settled in RMB. Foreign Currency (FX) conversions are limited to the “eligible amount” derived from actual trading results (profits, losses, and fees) and are typically automated by the PRC Futures Broker or depository bank to ensure adequate RMB balances include FX remitters may repatriate funds in the original currency or in RMB.

While QFIs can open settlement accounts with other financial institutions to facilitate domestic funds settlement, for spot FX trades and futures and derivatives trading, the primary custodian bank remains the singular gateway for all cross-border remittances of investment principal and income.

For margin obligations, OSPs may use USD as collateral, subject to the exchange’s valuation haircut (commonly 5%). Margin requirements vary by exchange and contract lifecycle, and may be adjusted in response to market conditions.

“The main barrier to using non bonded (duty paid) facilities is the strict VAT invoicing requirement. Under PRC VAT laws, non bonded deliveries are domestic transactions and must be accompanied by a specialized VAT invoice.”

Particulars	New QFI	OSP
Type of account	– a special RMB deposit account for direct RMB remittances; – a special foreign currency account; and – a separate RMB deposit account specifically linked to that foreign currency account.¹⁰	Separate Non‑Resident Account (NRAs)¹¹ for the relevant foreign currency (e.g. USD) or RMB. A foreign‑exchange settlement account to handle receipts, payments, and transfers linked to futures trading.¹²
Who is the account with?	Custodian bank	Designated depository banks
Can the funds be transferred between the different types of accounts?	No. These accounts use distinct naming conventions to ensure separation because the Regulations prohibit the mutual transfer of funds between different types of RMB accounts.	Funds in NRA accounts must remain fully segregated from other commercial funds used by the OSP. Transfers from NRA accounts must be transferred directly to the appropriate beneficiary or account under the applicable settlement rules.¹³
What can the accounts be used for?	The scope of account activity is determined by the Regulations. The permissible activities include remitted principal, funds for tax payments, interest income, proceeds from the sale of securities and futures, and cash dividends.	They function as special futures settlement account and transactions include: – trading profits or losses, service fees, – payments for goods, – settlement‑currency shortfalls, in each case, which are associated with futures trading under specific domestic categories.

Qualification Criteria

The New QFI and OSP routes impose distinct compliance, financial, and operational requirements, designed for different investors and market objectives. While both frameworks facilitate entry into a broadening suite of internationalized commodities, they are distinguished by fundamentally different compliance philosophies and operational prerequisites. The QFI route acts as a centralized institutional gateway for diversified asset allocation, whereas the OSP route serves as a specialized, technical bridge for direct exchange connectivity.

The following table compares some of the different criteria required by applicants under the two routes:

Criterion	QFI	OSP
Who is it ideal for?	Large-scale asset managers who value portfolio flexibility and a custodian-led application process.	Large commodity trading houses and market makers who wish to directly trade on the exchange and have the institutional capacity to manage the local liaison requirement.
Requirement for a clean regulatory record	The applicant must not be subject to any significant penalties in the past 3 years or since its establishment.	No equivalent requirement but applicants have to abide by the specific rules and decisions of the relevant commodity futures exchange which includes, that the applicant possess the specialized personnel, trading systems, equipment, and tools to ensure continuous operational capability.
Adverse impact to domestic market criteria	The applicant should not be someone that could impact the operation of domestic markets.	No equivalent requirement because this risk is determined by the CSRC working together with the relevant commodity futures exchange prior to the opening up of the access from offshore of the specific futures contract by that exchange.
Link between PRC regulator and applicant’s home regulator	No requirement.	In the case of an OSBP applicant, the futures regulator in the applicant’s home jurisdiction must have an agreement on regulatory cooperation in place with the CSRC.¹⁴
Licensing requirement in the applicant’s home jurisdiction	Applicants don’t have to be regulated in their home jurisdictions but do need to meet any requirements of their home jurisdiction in respect of the related activities of the applicant.¹⁵	In the case of an OSBP applicant, it must hold a futures brokerage licence (or similar) in its home jurisdiction.
Minimum operating history	No minimum requirement.	In the case of an OSBP applicant, it must have been in operation for at least 2 consecutive years.
Requirement for PRC local personnel	Not included in the CSRC QFI eligibility provisions.	Applicants must appoint: – a designated liaison; and – a senior contact person with a good integrity record to serve as the primary point of accountability with the relevant exchange.
Management of the application process	Centrally managed in that it is submitted to the CSRC via the custodian bank acting as liaison.	Centrally managed in that it is submitted to the relevant commodity futures exchange via the PRC Futures Broker acting as liaison. However, separate applications have to be made for each commodity futures exchange.

Is the dollar, as the tool for pricing international commodities, going to be challenged by the RMB any time soon?

The US Federal Reserve’s (the Fed‘s) answer to this question in July 2025 was as follows:

“… absent any large-scale, lasting disruptions which damage the value of the U.S. dollar as a store of value or medium of exchange and simultaneously bolster the attractiveness of dollar alternatives, the dollar will likely remain the world’s dominant international currency for the foreseeable future.”¹⁶

This conclusion was reached by the Fed at the end of a segment of their report where they expressly considered ‘Possible challenges to the U.S. dollar’s status’ which included as assessment of the possibility of RMB rivalling USD. On the RMB, their view was that:

“Even if Chinese GDP eventually exceeds U.S. GDP, the difference may not be enough to overcome the significant roadblocks to more widespread use of the Chinese renminbi. Importantly, the renminbi is not freely exchangeable, the Chinese capital account is not open, and investor confidence in Chinese institutions is relatively low…. These factors all make the Chinese renminbi relatively unattractive for international investors. To overcome these shortcomings, China has recently increased various efforts to promote international use of the renminbi, but their effect has been rather limited thus far ….”.¹⁷

At the end of 2023, it was reported that the RMB had become the fourth most popular currency in international settlements in November, overtaking the Japanese yen.¹⁸ The Fed report however, had RMB in fifth position behind the Japanese Yen at the end of 2024, confirming that the RMB is now in the top-five of globally traded currencies in the world. This clearly means that the RMB will not replace the USD at any immediate point in time as the primary currency for international settlements. However, that does not mean the RMB will not begin to move up the ranks of popular currencies in the short-medium term.

It was approximated at the end of 2023 that a fifth of global oil trades were settled in currencies other than the USD although the percentage of that which can be claimed to have settled in RMB is not clear.¹⁹ What is however, clear is that the number of cross-border commodity transactions that are settling in RMB is increasing, including crude oil purchases between Saudi Arabia and China. However, even if Saudi Arabia wanted to transact all of its oil sales to China in RMB, essentially to create a ‘Petroyuan’, there is presently an inherent limit to that process. As highlighted by S&P Global “If Saudi-China oil trade were fully conducted in renminbi, it would be challenging to hold, spend, or convert the resulting tens of billions of petroyuan through existing bilateral or international channels. This helps explain why the yuan has made little progress in becoming a meaningful currency for oil settlement despite booming trade between the two countries.“²⁰

Increased purchases of oil in RMB by China may not be the best way to anticipate how new avenues of RMB demand in commodities could follow. This is because, over 2024 and 2025, with the surge of electric vehicle use in China and the slowdown in its property and construction sector, demand for oil actually reduced by approximately 2% compared to 2023.²¹ Clearly the electrification of China, with its growing use of renewable energy, makes it less oil dependent over time.

A vigorous commercial debate is currently ongoing between the major iron-ore producers and the China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG), the central buyer for state-owned steel makers in China, on how imports of iron-ore to China should be priced. One of the grounds of the debate, is over which benchmark should be used to price spot iron-ore sales with CMRG arguing in favour of RMB denominated Chinese iron-ore indices instead of USD denominated S&P’s Platts benchmark index.²²

“As supply chains begin to re-orient to the geopolitical spheres of influence, it is inevitable that countries are now more incentivised than any time in the past 80 years to consider trading in other currencies.”

Separate to the RMB, the number of BRICs countries trading among themselves using currencies other than the USD is growing. Since 2023, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Indonesia have become full BRICS members, taking total membership to now 11 countries.²³ The expanded BRICS membership, as of 2023, represented approximately 40% of GDP at purchasing power parity.²⁴ In the context of commodities, BRICS countries account for 44% of global production of energy and natural resources, with 44% of the world’s oil reserves, 38% of global natural gas production and 55% of the world’s natural gas reserves. Notably, it also holds 72% of the world’s rare mineral reserves.²⁵ At least as between the BRICS countries, the opportunity for commodity transactions will, therefore, simply increase in their own currencies.

In addition, new demand sources for gold can materialise if the newly tested BRICS ‘Unit’, a digital currency for settlement of payments between BRICS economies, takes off as an alternative settlement mechanism that does not use SWIFT and avoids USD settlements. This is because the value of a Unit is backed 40% by gold and 60% by a basket of the domestic fiat currencies of the BRICS participating governments.²⁶ Gold demand will only increase as it will be needed to back the issuance of new Units by the BRICS members.

The UNIT does not replace the currencies of the BRICS countries and nor does it provide the opportunity for retail use.²⁷

Conclusion

As highlighted by the Fed report, only large-scale, lasting disruptions that can damage the value of USD, are likely to make any difference to the dominance of USD. Although that is true for financial assets, there is no reason why that position should extend to the current way in which certain commodities are priced.

The link between commodities and currencies in the Bretton-Woods underpinning of currencies with gold reserves or the post-1974 Petrodollar system, cannot be ignored. However, as supply chains begin to re-orient to the geopolitical spheres of influence, it is inevitable that countries are now more incentivised than any time in the past 80 years to consider trading in other currencies. Therefore, given the direction of travel, of the various alternative currencies, as the largest consumer of many commodities, China is well-positioned to shift from ‘price-taker’ to ‘price-maker’. The liberalisation of Chinese commodity futures markets, the greater exchangeability of the RMB and the increased ease to move capital in and out of China from offshore trading, could help drive the greater adoption of commodity pricing in RMB. To be clear, this is not something that will happen overnight but it is clear that the process has begun.

Table

Chinese Commodity Futures Contracts Comparison of product access via the two main routes²⁸

Commodity Futures Exchange	New QFI	Overseas Participants
SHFE	Gold, Silver, Copper, Aluminium, Zinc, Steel Rebar, Hot Rolled Coils, Stainless Steel, Fuel oil, Woodpulp Bitumen, Natural Rubber, Lead, Tin.	Gold, Silver, Copper Cathode, Aluminium, Zinc, Lead, Nickle²⁹, Tin, Aluminium Oxide, Steel Rebar, Wire Rod, Hot-Rolled Coil, Stainless Steel, Fuel Oil, Bitumen, Butadiene Rubber, Natural Rubber, Bleached Softwood Kraft Pulp, Cast Aluminium Alloy.
DCE	No. 1 Soybean, No. 2 Soybean, Soybean Meal, Soybean Oil, RBD Palm Olein, Iron Ore, LLDPE, PP, PVC, EB.	No. 1 Soybean, No. 2 Soybean, Soybean Meal, Soybean Oil, RBD Palm Olein, Iron Ore.
ZCE	PTA, Methanol, Rapeseed Oil, Rapeseed Meal, Peanut Kernel, White Sugar, Polyester Staple Fiber, Paraxylene, Bottle-grade PET resin, Manganese Silicon, Flat Glass, Soda Ash, Ferrosilicon.	PTA, Rapeseed Oil, Rapeseed Meal, Peanut Kernel, (Polyester Staple Fiber, Paraxylene, Bottle-grade PET resin)³⁰
INE	Crude Oil, TSR20, Low Sulphur Fuel Oil, Bonded Copper, Containerized Freight Index (Europe Service).	Crude Oil, TSR20, Low Sulphur Fuel Oil, Bonded Copper, Containerized Freight Index (Europe Service).
GFEX	Silicon Metal, Lithium Carbonate, Poly Silicon.	Lithium Carbonate.³¹