Briefing

Financing satellites – Capital, control and the renewed relevance of the Space Protocol

Imagine a lender financing a satellite operator. The operator owns valuable spacecraft in orbit, serves a growing customer base and generates recurring revenues from connectivity, imagery or data. On paper, the business appears attractive and capable of supporting substantial financing. But what ultimately determines its value? Is it the spacecraft itself, or the operator’s ability to control the network, access spectrum (the legal right to use certain radio frequencies), maintain regulatory approvals and deliver services to customers? If those rights are restricted, transferred or withdrawn, how much of the satellite business’s value remains? These questions are becoming increasingly important as satellite systems move beyond specialised applications and become part of communications, defence, environmental monitoring and public infrastructure.

In Parts I and II of this series, we examined whether satellite financing could evolve from traditional project-finance structures, principally reliant on long-term contractual revenues, towards a model in which satellites themselves play a greater role within lenders’ security packages. We also considered whether the Space Assets Protocol to the Cape Town Convention could provide the harmonised international framework required to support the financing of space assets.

Developments between May and September 2026 place those questions within a broader commercial and strategic context. Recent trends show that established satellite operators can attract substantial bank debt, institutional equity and acquisition financing. At the same time, disputes over spectrum, the growth of sovereign procurement (purchase made by a State or public authority) and the expansion of satellite services into essential infrastructure show that commercial value is increasingly shaped by questions of access, control and strategic autonomy.

In parallel, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s accession to the Space Protocol and UNIDROIT’s continuing work through its dedicated Focus Group have brought renewed attention to the instrument and its potential role in creating greater legal certainty.

Against that background, this article examines: (i) what recent trends reveal about the financing of established satellite businesses; (ii) how spectrum policy, sovereign demand and state strategy are shaping the sector; (iii) how new applications are integrating satellites into commercial and public infrastructure; and (iv) why recent activity surrounding the Space Protocol is particularly relevant in this changing environment.

I. Recent trends: substantial capital for integrated satellite businesses

On 21 May 2026, ICEYE announced a €300 million three-year committed revolving credit facility provided by a syndicate of seven banks. The facility is intended to support guarantees required under customer contracts, provide a liquidity backstop (emergency / backup funding available if the company needs cash) and finance the company’s continued growth.¹

On 9 June 2026, ICEYE subsequently announced €450 million of primary Series F equity as part of a transaction exceeding €1 billion and valuing the company at more than €10 billion.² ICEYE also referred to 2025 revenues exceeding €250 million and a contracted backlog of more than €1.5 billion, although those figures were unaudited.

The coexistence of commercial bank debt and substantial institutional equity is significant. It indicates that an established satellite operator can increasingly be assessed through familiar financing measures, including revenue, profitability, backlog, liquidity, contractual performance and growth prospects.

The scale and structure of the financing also show that leading satellite businesses are no longer dependent solely on specialist investors or individual project revenues. ICEYE is attracting capital through instruments commonly used by mature international companies with substantial customers, recurring demand and expansion plans.

The value being financed nevertheless extends well beyond the spacecraft. ICEYE’s business combines satellite manufacturing, proprietary technology, Earth-observation data, customer contracts and operational expertise. The revolving facility is intended to support the performance of that wider business, including the guarantees required under customer contracts.

Rocket Lab’s proposed acquisition of Iridium provides a further example of large-scale capital being deployed in the satellite sector. Under the transaction announced on 29 June 2026, Rocket Lab agreed to acquire Iridium at an enterprise value of approximately US$8 billion. The transaction is supported by financing commitments including a US$3.6 billion senior secured bridge facility from Deutsche Bank and Wells Fargo.³

The strategic rationale extends well beyond the acquisition of Iridium’s spacecraft. The transaction would combine Rocket Lab’s launch and satellite-manufacturing capabilities with Iridium’s operational low-Earth-orbit network (network (or constellation) of satellites operating relatively close to Earth, typically between about 160 km and 2,000 km above the Earth’s surface), coordinated spectrum and customer base across government, aviation, maritime and commercial markets. Iridium had more than 2.55 million subscribers at the time of the announcement.⁴

The proposed acquisition therefore reflects the value attached to an integrated satellite platform: notably spacecraft, spectrum, infrastructure, technology, customers and recurring services (services that generate repeated, ongoing revenue, usually through subscriptions, long-term contracts or regular usage fees). It also illustrates increasing vertical integration, as businesses seek to control a greater share of the value chain from manufacturing and launch to network operation and service delivery.

Taken together, the ICEYE and Iridium transactions demonstrate that substantial capital is available to established satellite operators with strong revenues, customers and strategic capabilities.

Broader investment data reinforce this picture. Global venture funding to space and satellite startups reached US$20.3 billion for 2026 as at the end of August, already the highest annual total on record with four months of the year remaining. United States companies captured approximately US$12.7 billion of that figure, representing more than sixty per cent of global space investment. China accounted for approximately twenty per cent and Europe for roughly ten per cent.⁵

Several individual transactions during the summer of 2026 confirm the sector’s scale. K2 Space, a Los Angeles-based manufacturer of large, low-cost satellite buses, closed a US$500 million Series D round in July 2026 at a valuation of US$6.8 billion. In August 2026, Yuanxin Satellite, the Chinese operator of the Qianfan constellation marketed as SpaceSail, closed approximately US$1 billion in new funding, reinforcing the state-linked investment model discussed in Part II.⁶

Not all developments have been positive. Hughes Satellite Systems, a subsidiary of EchoStar and a significant provider of satellite broadband, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States during the summer of 2026. The filing followed financial difficulties linked in part to its JUPITER 3 satellite lease and the broader consequences of EchoStar’s FCC-directed spectrum dispositions in 2025. The case illustrates that even substantial satellite businesses remain exposed to financial distress when debt obligations, spectrum policy and corporate restructuring intersect.⁷

The coexistence of record investment and corporate restructuring within the same period underscores a central tension in the sector. Capital is flowing at unprecedented levels into operators with strong technology, spectrum and customer positions, while businesses unable to maintain that combination may face significant financial difficulty.

The more revealing question is what that capital is financing. Recent trends suggest that investors and lenders are not simply financing objects placed in orbit but also financing control of integrated systems capable of converting those objects into continuing commercial and strategic services.

II. Spectrum and sovereignty: who controls access to the market?

Recent developments concerning spectrum allocation and government procurement show that satellite markets are increasingly shaped by public policy as well as commercial demand.

In May 2026, the European Commission proposed a new approach to the authorisation of mobile satellite services in the harmonised 2 GHz frequency band after existing licences expire in 2027. The proposal would reserve part of the available spectrum for secure governmental communications, allocate another portion to European commercial operators and leave the remainder open to wider competition.⁸

SpaceX challenged the proposal, arguing that the spectrum available to non-European operators would be insufficient to support high-quality direct-to-device services and could create interference and service-continuity concerns.⁹

The dispute illustrates why spectrum is more than an administrative authorisation. A satellite network may be technically capable of delivering a service, but it cannot generate revenues in a particular market without lawful access to the frequencies needed to provide that service.

Spectrum policy can therefore determine which operators may compete, which services they can offer and how widely those services can be deployed. It can also alter the economic value of existing satellite infrastructure without any physical change to the spacecraft themselves.

The Commission’s proposal places these commercial questions within a wider debate over European resilience, security and technological sovereignty. Satellite connectivity is increasingly treated as part of the infrastructure required for defence, emergency response and secure governmental communications.

Government demand is shaping the sector in a different but related way. On 17 June 2026, CTI Aeroespacial entered into a contract to acquire two additional ICEYE synthetic-aperture radar satellite systems for operation by the Portuguese Air Force. The systems are intended to support defence and security, maritime monitoring, environmental protection and disaster response.¹⁰

Sovereign procurement can provide substantial contracts, strong counterparties and greater revenue visibility. It may also help states develop national technical expertise and reduce their dependence on external providers for strategically important information and communications.

The strategic nature of these services can, however, introduce additional legal considerations. Satellites used for defence, intelligence or critical communications may be subject to export controls, foreign-investment review, national-security restrictions and limitations on ownership or operational control.

China’s SpaceSail constellation provides a further illustration of the relationship between satellite investment and state strategy. The state-backed project is intended to develop a large-scale low-Earth-orbit broadband network and has been presented as a potential Chinese competitor to Starlink.¹¹

The project shows that investment in satellite infrastructure may be justified by industrial policy, technological autonomy and geopolitical influence as well as immediate commercial returns.

Commercial lenders, institutional investors and states may therefore invest in the same sector for different reasons. A lender may focus on revenue, contracts and repayment. A state may also value secure communications, domestic industrial capacity and independence from foreign networks.

The common issue is control. Spectrum allocation determines access to frequencies. Sovereign procurement determines who supplies strategically important services. State investment influences which networks are built and where they can operate.

In the United States, a major regulatory development has reinforced the importance of the licensing environment. On 22 July 2026, the Federal Communications Commission adopted a Report and Order replacing its long-standing Part 25 satellite licensing framework with a new Part 100. The reform introduces a licensing “assembly line” designed to compress review timelines from years to months and establishes a “default to yes” regime under which applications satisfying the new rules are presumed to serve the public interest. The order also includes updated orbital-safety requirements, new processing-round procedures for spectrum allocation and a US$10 million surety-bond requirement to deter speculative filings.¹²

The FCC’s reform matters for the global satellite market because it could accelerate the deployment and replenishment of constellations, reduce regulatory uncertainty for operators and potentially encourage other jurisdictions to modernise their own licensing regimes. It also illustrates how national regulatory frameworks shape access to the market, complementing the spectrum-policy dynamics discussed above.

Sovereign procurement accelerated further during the summer of 2026. On 4 August 2026, Telesat secured a CA$2.3 billion Arctic military satellite communications contract with the Government of Canada, expanding its Lightspeed constellation by 69 satellites, a 44 per cent capacity increase. The contract is significant both for its scale and for its focus on military communications in the Arctic, a region of increasing strategic importance where terrestrial alternatives are limited.¹³

Poland’s experience illustrates the speed at which sovereign satellite capabilities can now be deployed. The POLSARIS synthetic-aperture radar constellation, built by ICEYE under a contract signed in May 2025 at approximately €200 million, was handed over to the Polish Armed Forces in May 2026. The programme delivered four operational radar satellites, a completed ground segment and trained military personnel in under twelve months, representing one of the fastest operational satellite deployments on record.¹⁴

In September 2026, the United Kingdom selected Open Cosmos as a certified supplier under the TacSys (Tactical Communication System) procurement framework, valued at up to £8 billion through 2034. The framework is intended to support UK Ministry of Defence contracts for sovereign low-Earth-orbit satellite communications infrastructure. Separately, in August 2026, Eutelsat announced the launch of the LEO satellite segment of Europe’s IRIS² programme, deploying 330 LEO satellites to strengthen Europe’s sovereign connectivity infrastructure.¹⁵

These developments confirm that sovereign demand is no longer confined to individual procurement contracts. It is increasingly shaping constellation design, industrial partnerships and the broader architecture of satellite infrastructure in Europe, North America and beyond. Regulation and sovereignty are therefore not peripheral to the satellite market.

III. New applications: satellites as continuing infrastructure

Satellites are also becoming more deeply integrated into commercial and public infrastructure. Aviation connectivity, secure governmental communications, Earth observation, emergency response and future non-terrestrial telecommunications networks may create larger markets, more diversified customers and increasingly recurring revenues.

In the first quarter of 2026, SES announced €306 million of new business and contract renewals, contributing to a gross backlog of €6.2 billion. Mobility and government activity were among the principal drivers of growth.¹⁶ SES has continued to position itself as a multi-orbit provider combining satellite networks, ground capabilities, software and services.

This model reflects an important development in the sector. Customers increasingly purchase connectivity and managed services rather than isolated satellite capacity. The commercial product is therefore the continuing service delivered by the network, not merely access to an individual spacecraft.

Earth observation is undergoing a comparable evolution. In June 2026, SatSure Analytics received support from India’s space regulator to develop artificial-intelligence models using satellite and drone data, with potential applications in agriculture, infrastructure and finance.¹⁷

The company described Earth observation as moving from project-specific analytics towards reusable intelligence infrastructure. Rather than selling individual images for individual projects, providers can develop continuing data products and decision-making tools for multiple sectors.

Greece provides another example of satellite technology becoming part of public infrastructure. In 2026, the country integrated a dedicated thermal-satellite constellation into its national firefighting system to support early wildfire detection and emergency response.¹⁸

The system illustrates how satellite services can be incorporated into continuing governmental functions rather than used only for occasional projects. Similar applications may develop in environmental monitoring, agriculture, border surveillance and disaster management.

The anticipated integration of satellite networks into future 6G infrastructure could reinforce this trend. If non-terrestrial networks become a routine component of global telecommunications, satellite connectivity may cease to be regarded as a specialised alternative and instead become part of ordinary communications infrastructure.

The anticipated integration of satellite connectivity into terrestrial telecommunications is no longer entirely speculative. In February 2026, the United Kingdom’s Ofcom finalised its Direct-to-Device Exemption Regulations, and O2 Satellite, using SpaceX’s Starlink Direct to Cell, launched the first commercial direct-to-device satellite service under the UK Ofcom framework on 26 February 2026. The service provides messaging and data connectivity to standard smartphones without requiring specialised hardware.¹⁹ This development represents a concrete step towards the convergence of satellite and terrestrial mobile services discussed above.

Rocket Lab’s activities during the summer of 2026 further illustrate the expansion of defence-related satellite applications. On 30 July 2026, Rocket Lab signed a US$397 million contract with the U.S. Space Force to design, manufacture, launch and operate Flatellite satellites for the Space-Based Airborne Moving Target Indicator programme. The contract reinforces the trend towards vertically integrated satellite companies serving both commercial and government customers.²⁰

The pace of launch activity has also intensified. SpaceX reached 100 orbital launches in the first eight months of 2026, continuing to demonstrate the increasingly routine nature of access to orbit. This cadence supports rapid constellation deployment and replenishment, making satellite infrastructure more responsive to commercial and strategic demand.²¹

For operators and financiers, this expansion may produce broader markets, more diversified revenues and greater visibility over future demand.

It also changes the nature of the sector. Satellite operators are increasingly becoming providers of communications, information and public infrastructure rather than simply owners of spacecraft.

The distinction matters because the commercial value of these businesses depends on their ability to maintain an entire service: the satellite, the spectrum, the ground infrastructure, the software, the data and the customer relationship.

This dependency is not unique to satellites, but it is especially visible in space. A ship or aircraft can normally be physically repossessed, inspected and transferred to another operator through established registries and secondary markets. A satellite remains in orbit and can be commercially useful only if an operator can lawfully control it, communicate with it and integrate it into a functioning network.

The development of satellite-based services therefore makes questions of operational continuity and legal control increasingly important. As satellite systems become more useful, the legal and technical framework surrounding their operation becomes more significant.

IV. The Space Protocol: an international framework for legal certainty

Against this commercial and strategic background, recent institutional activity surrounding the Space Protocol is particularly important.

On 4 June 2026, the Democratic Republic of Congo deposited its instrument of accession to the Space Protocol, becoming the second contracting state after Paraguay.²² The Protocol has not yet entered into force, and the proposed international registry has not yet been established as an operational registry.

The DRC’s accession nevertheless represents a concrete step in the development of the regime. It demonstrates continuing governmental engagement with the Cape Town Convention system and provides renewed visibility to an instrument that had attracted limited progress since its adoption.

In April 2026, UNIDROIT confirmed that implementation of the Space Protocol remains a high-priority item within its 2026–2028 work programme.²³

UNIDROIT’s report also records targeted consultations with the DRC concerning the Cape Town Convention system, the potential benefits of the Space Protocol and the declarations available to contracting states.²⁴

This work matters because the Protocol’s future depends not only on further accessions, but also on whether governments, operators and lenders understand how the regime could operate in real transactions. The key question is whether the Protocol can be implemented in a way that is clear, proportionate and commercially useful.

The Protocol is intended to create a harmonised framework for interests in identifiable space assets. In practical terms, it would allow a lender to identify the relevant satellite, register its interest internationally, establish its priority over competing claims and rely on recognised remedies if the debtor defaults.

Those functions respond to a genuine difficulty in satellite finance. A satellite operates beyond national territory, may be financed across several jurisdictions and cannot be physically possessed in the ordinary way. Without a common system, creditors may face uncertainty over which law applies, whether their interest is visible and how it ranks against competing creditors.

The international registry would therefore serve as the mechanism through which the wider legal framework operates: registration would make creditor interests visible and help determine priority, while the Protocol would also provide rules concerning default and insolvency.

National rules would continue to govern spectrum, licensing, export controls and national-security approvals. The Protocol would provide the international legal foundation for rights in the space asset itself, with domestic regulatory and contractual arrangements continuing to govern the operational environment around that asset.

Recent institutional activity has continued beyond the accession itself. In August 2026, UNIDROIT participated in the APEC Third Senior Officials’ Meeting in Dalian, China, where it presented on the coordination of private-law reform and regulation to promote innovation. The presentation drew on the Cape Town Convention and its Protocols, illustrating their role within broader structural-reform agendas across the Asia-Pacific region. Engagement with APEC is significant because it introduces the Convention system to economies with growing satellite, manufacturing and financing interests.²⁵

The 15th Cape Town Convention Academic Project Conference, held in September 2026 at the University of Cambridge, provided a further opportunity for dialogue on the practical implementation of the Convention and its Protocols, including the Space Protocol. A related UNIDROIT Access to Credit Workshop at the same venue reviewed a draft white paper on UNIDROIT’s future strategy in the access-to-credit field, for submission to the Governing Council and General Assembly in December 2026.²⁶

These developments suggest that the institutional momentum around the Cape Town Convention system, and the Space Protocol in particular, is broadening rather than stalling. The engagement with APEC, the forthcoming academic conference and the continuing work of UNIDROIT’s Focus Group indicate a sustained effort to build the practical and political foundations for wider adoption.

The next question is whether that activity will lead to wider participation from states with significant satellite, manufacturing and financing markets, and whether operators and lenders will regard the Protocol as capable of improving real transactions.

Conclusion

Developments between May and September 2026 reveal a satellite sector in which capital, commercial growth and strategic control are becoming increasingly connected.

The ICEYE financings, Rocket Lab’s proposed acquisition of Iridium, record global space investment exceeding US$20.3 billion through August 2026, and Amazon’s acquisition of Globalstar show that established and emerging operators alike can attract substantial bank debt, institutional equity and acquisition financing. They also show that investors value integrated businesses combining spacecraft, technology, spectrum, infrastructure, customers and recurring services.

The European spectrum debate, Portugal’s procurement of additional ICEYE systems, Poland’s rapid deployment of the POLSARIS constellation, Telesat’s CA$2.3 billion Arctic military contract, the United Kingdom’s £8 billion TacSys framework, and the development of China’s SpaceSail constellation demonstrate that the sector is being shaped by governments on multiple continents simultaneously. Access to frequencies, secure communications, national technological capacity and control over critical infrastructure are becoming central commercial and political considerations.

New applications in connectivity, Earth observation, direct-to-device satellite services and emergency response show satellite services becoming part of continuing economic and public functions. The FCC’s Space Modernization Order, the UK’s Ofcom Direct-to-Device framework and the EU’s IRIS² programme illustrate how regulatory reform is accelerating this integration. As this process deepens, the ability to maintain control of the network and preserve access to the rights required to operate it becomes increasingly important.

Recent activity surrounding the Space Protocol must be understood within that wider context. As satellite systems become more valuable, more international and more strategically important, the need for clear and predictable rules governing creditor interests becomes more pressing. UNIDROIT’s engagement with APEC and the forthcoming Cape Town Convention Academic Project Conference at Cambridge indicate continuing institutional momentum.

UNIDROIT’s proposed framework cannot determine every licence, spectrum allocation or national-security approval. It can, however, provide a common legal basis for identifying space assets, registering interests, determining priority and protecting creditors across participating jurisdictions.

The significance of the current period may lie in the growing importance of control: control of integrated businesses, control of spectrum and market access, control of strategically important services and legal control over interests in assets operating beyond national territory.

The Space Protocol offers one of the few international attempts to bring greater legal certainty to that environment. Whether it succeeds will depend on wider state participation and market acceptance, but the DRC’s accession and UNIDROIT’s renewed implementation work provide a clear reason to follow its progress closely.

Mamoune Zizi, Stagiaire, assisted in the preparation of this briefing

Footnotes

“ICEYE secures €300 million revolving credit facility to support continued growth“, 21 May 2026
“ICEYE leads a new era of sovereign intelligence from space with €1B funding round“, 9 June 2026
Rocket Lab buys Iridium in $8 billion deal to take on SpaceX | Reuters, 29 June 2026
Rocket Lab to Acquire Iridium in Historic Deal, Creating A Fully Vertically Integrated Space Powerhouse Primed for Growth , 29 June 2026
https://www.techtimes.com/articles/325962/20260829/space-startup-funding-hits-record-203b-2026-orbital-compute-leads-surge.htm
“K2 Space closes $500M Series D at $6.8B valuation”, TechCrunch, July 2026; “Yuanxin Satellite closes ~$1B funding round for Qianfan constellation”, SpaceNews, August 2026.
“Hughes Satellite Systems files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection”, Reuters, July 2026; see also In re Hughes Satellite Systems, Inc., (Bankr. D. Del. 2026): https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/echostars-satellite-internet-unit-hughes-files-bankruptcy-2026-08-03/
Commission proposes new authorisation for mobile satellite services for EU’s resilience and competitiveness | Shaping Europe’s digital future, 27 May 2026
Starlink pushes back against EU-imposed restrictions on satellite telephony, 1 July 2026
Portugal acquires two additional ICEYE SAR satellites to scale sovereign intelligence from space, 17 June 2026
What is China’s SpaceSail, and could it rival Elon Musk’s Starlink? | China | The Guardian, 25 June 2026
Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order, FCC 26, “Space Innovation: Modernization of FCC Space Regulations” (adopted 22 July 2026); see also FCC Adopts Historic Space Modernization Order, 22 July 2026.
“Telesat secures CA$2.3 billion Arctic military satellite communications contract with Government of Canada”, Telesat press release, 4 August 2026.
“ICEYE hands over POLSARIS constellation to Polish Armed Forces”, ICEYE press release, May 2026; see also “Poland’s POLSARIS: From contract to orbit in under twelve months”, SpaceNews, May 2026.
“Open Cosmos selected as certified supplier under UK MoD TacSys framework”, Open Cosmos press release, September 2026; “Eutelsat announces launch of LEO satellite segment of Europe’s IRIS² programme”, Eutelsat press release, August 2026.
SES Delivers Robust Q1 2026 Results & Reiterates Full-Year Outlook | SES, 12 May 2026
India’s SatSure bags $2.6 million grant to build AI-powered Earth observation models | Reuters, 11 June 2026
Greece becomes first country to use dedicated satellite network to detect wildfires | AP News, 26 June 2026
Ofcom, The Wireless Telegraphy (Direct-to-Device Exemption) Regulations 2026 (S.I. 2026); “O2 Satellite launches UK’s first commercial direct-to-device satellite service”, O2 press release, 26 February 2026.
“Rocket Lab signs $397M contract with U.S. Space Force for Flatellite SBAMTI programme”, Rocket Lab press release, 30 July 2026.
“SpaceX reaches 100 orbital launches in 2026”, SpaceNews, August 2026.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo becomes a Party to the Full Cape Town Convention System – UNIDROIT, 5 June 2026
Implementation and status of the Space Protocol, Governing Council, 107th session, Document C.D. (107) 12, April 2026
Ibid., paragraph 11.
UNIDROIT at APEC Third Senior Officials’ Meeting, Dalian, China, August 2026.
“15th Cape Town Convention Academic Project Conference”, University of Cambridge, September 2026; UNIDROIT Access to Credit Workshop, September 2026