Redaction, Relevance, and Proportionality under PD 57AD: Lessons from ICG Manager Ltd v Colliers [2026] EWHC 1346 (Ch)
Summary
The English High Court has reinforced the position that redaction under Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), Practice Direction (PD) 57AD is a narrow exception, not a strategic tool. While relevance will be interpreted broadly, the court will refuse expansive disclosure (i.e. to unredact documents) where it is not proportionate and may instead impose controlled access solutions such as “Hollander” orders.
In a judgment handed down recently by the London High Court in ICG Manager Limited & Ors v Colliers International Valuation UK LLP1 the court addressed issues arising from an Extended Disclosure order where the claimants produced 462 documents in redacted form, a number of which were subject to very extensive redaction.
The defendant applied under paragraph 17.1 of PD 57AD for the removal of redactions. The claimants contended that the redactions satisfied the dual conditions of confidentiality and irrelevance, and that an order for unredacted production would be neither reasonable nor proportionate.
Under PD 57AD, a party can redact part of a document only where the redacted material is: (1) “irrelevant to any issue in the proceedings, and confidential”; both conditions must be satisfied: confidentiality alone is not enough, nor is irrelevance. or (2) privileged.
The court was required to consider three questions:
- whether the redacted material was relevant;
- whether redaction complied with PD 57AD, paragraph 16; and
- whether ordering the documents to be unredacted would be reasonable and proportionate.
1. Was the material relevant?
Applying the House of Lords’ findings in O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police2, the court affirmed that “Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires proof…relevant evidence is evidence which makes the matter which requires proof more or less probable.”
The practical point is that when reviewing a document, it is not enough to ask whether the redacted material appears, on its face to have nothing to do with the events in dispute. The real question is whether the information could, directly or indirectly, make any fact in issue more or less probable. Where a court has ordered Extended Disclosure in respect of documents going to a particular issue, the default position is that those documents must be produced without redaction, subject only to the narrow-permitted grounds for withholding or redaction.
The court held that relevance is assessed by reference to the pleaded issues, not by whether the disclosing party views the material as core to the case.
2. Did the redaction comply with PD 57AD, paragraph 16?
The case is also a warning against approaching redaction loosely. Adopting the language of LLC Eurochem North-West-2 v Société Générale SA3, the court emphasised that “the criteria ha[s] to be applied scrupulously.” A party giving disclosure cannot simply adopt a cautious approach to redaction and leave it to the receiving party to raise objections.
To do so is inconsistent with the overriding objective of the CPRs. It also carries real practical consequences: it shifts the burden of decision-making onto the receiving party, drives up costs on all sides, and, where it gives rise to further applications or disrupts proceedings, wastes court time and causes inconvenience to other court users. The court confirmed that where this occurs, the financial consequences “ought to be reflected in the court’s approach to costs.“
3. Was it reasonable and proportionate to order the documents to be unredacted?
Despite finding relevance, the court refused wholesale unredaction because it would generate significant additional disclosure exercises; risked collateral disputes on unrelated assets; would increase costs and extend the trial; and engaged confidentiality concerns, particularly regarding third-party data.
“Hollander” Orders.
Where the court cannot immediately decide whether material is both irrelevant and confidential, it may make a “Hollander” order requiring disclosure first to the counterparty’s legal advisers, pending further determination. This provides a practical solution in marginal cases. However, it serves no purpose where the court is already in a position to conclude both that non-compliance has occurred and that a further order should be made. In this case, the court made a Hollander order requiring unredacted copies of three categories of document to be provided to the defendant’s legal advisers.
The Costs Orders
The costs of and associated with the redaction application were not inconsiderable. According to the judgment, the defendant’s costs of the application were nearly £140,000 and the claimants’ exceeded £260,000, both sums being in addition to the wider costs of the proceedings.
What This Means In Practice
The judgment highlights that the courts give careful analysis to redaction issues.
If material could conceivably affect how the court assesses a fact in issue, even indirectly or by comparison with other transactions or decisions, an irrelevance argument may be difficult to sustain.
Above all, redaction should not be treated as the cautious default. The court has made clear that this approach is inconsistent with a party’s obligations under PD 57AD and may have real costs consequences. Each redaction decision should therefore be taken with care.
Paddy Wheeler, Paralegal, assisted in the preparation of this briefing.
Footnotes
- ICG Manager Ltd v Colliers [2026] EWHC 1346 (Ch)
- O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534
- LLC Eurochem North-West-2 v Société Générale SA [2025] EWHC 1938 (Comm)