What Do COP28 and COP29 Really Tell Us About the Paris Agreement and Net Zero Ambitions?

At a glance

There is an assumption that achieving a 1.5°C threshold for global warming and a target of net zero emissions by 2050 are feasible if only we did more. The evidence and the reality, based on the outcomes of the last two international climate change meetings under the Paris Agreement 2015, tell us that we are a long way from that.

In this briefing, we consider the financing steps required to fund a 2050 net zero outcome and look objectively at the impact on global net zero ambitions of a second withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement.

Introduction

The Conference of the Parties (COP), meeting as the Parties to the Paris Agreement, took place in Dubai in late 2023 (COP28). It took stock of the progress made by the Paris Agreement and identified the steps needed to achieve the objective of keeping the increase in global warming to 1.5°C by 2050 (the Global Stocktake).

The next COP was held in Baku at the end of November 2024 (COP29). This was labelled the ‘finance’ COP because it was meant to determine a new collective quantified goal on climate finance and to progress the question around how the steps identified in the Global Stocktake would be financed.

These two COPs, recognised as critical to the question of whether the net zero target can be achieved, have now delivered. Have they delivered enough and if not, what does that mean for the Paris Agreement?

COP28 and the Global Stocktake

Enshrined into Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, the purpose of the Global Stocktake is to evaluate the collective progress of the Paris Agreement signatory countries (Paris Agreement Parties), as set out in their respective nationally determined contributions (NDCs), against three of the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement listed under Article 2. These goals are to:

• reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions sufficiently so as to keep global temperature rise below 2°C (the 2 degree target) and ideally 1.5°C (the 1.5 degree target).
• build resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate impacts.
• secure finance and support for low-carbon and climate-resilient development.

The outcome of this exercise was the decision reached at COP 28¹ (the Global Stocktake Decision) which called for:

• Tripling of global renewable energy capacity
• Doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency by 2030
• Accelerating global efforts towards the phase down of unabated coal power
• Accelerating global efforts towards net zero emissions energy systems using zero or low carbon fuels by 2050
• Transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just and equitable manner in this critical decade
• Phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies
• Accelerating zero and low emissions technologies, reduction of emissions from road transport and reducing non-CO₂ emissions
• Implementing domestic mitigation measures
• Using voluntary cooperation between Paris Agreement Parties under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to raise their respective ambitions under their NDCs.

This is effectively a wish list of items because the language of the Global Stocktake Decision calls on the Paris Agreement Parties to “contribute to … global efforts” to achieve these objectives via their NDCs, taking into account their different national circumstances, pathways and approaches.² The soft language used is the equivalent of an invitation for countries to do more whilst at the same time acknowledging the related challenge around how this is to be financed.

The Global Stocktake Decision recognised the “deep, rapid and sustained reductions” of global GHG emissions required to achieve the 1.5 degree target³:

In short, to achieve the 1.5 degree target, within the next six years our collective GHG reductions need to ratchet up from 5.3% to 43%. In the updated NDC synthesis report from the UNFCCC secretariat prepared just ahead of COP29, it was noted that the current NDCs suggested a 2.6% reduction by 2030 against a 2019 baseline. The report noted that: “this implies an urgent need for either a significant increase in the level of ambition of NDCs between now and 2030 or a significant overachievement of the latest NDCs, or a combination of both, in order to attain the cost-effective emission levels suggested in many of the scenarios considered by the IPCC. If emissions are not reduced by 2030, they will need to be substantially reduced thereafter to compensate for the slow start on the path to net zero emissions. The latest IPCC scenario data set does not contain scenarios of still reaching the goal of 1.5 °C with low or limited overshoot after 2030 if emission levels are kept in line with those based on implementation of the current NDCs up until 2030.”⁵

Is this achievable given that for four of the next six years, President Trump will be in office and the United States has announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for the second time? The further away we get from achieving the 1.5 degree target by 2030, the greater the pressure on subsequent years to overdeliver on their respective NDCs. This requires all Paris Agreement Parties to pull together in the same direction at a pace and urgency that is accepted by all.

The Global Stocktake Decision also acknowledges the importance of financing in achieving the goals listed above. It⁶ flags the following numbers:

The Global Stocktake invited a dialogue on implementing its outcomes through a work programme, starting from COP29 and concluding at COP33. In short, COP28 did not address how the financing will be provided but instead looked to subsequent meetings to resolve questions of implementation. This process became the ‘United Arab Emirates dialogue on implementing the global stocktake outcomes’ (the UAE Dialogue).

Finance – the context

Pursuant to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, “developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation” and “developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance…”.

To put the track record of climate finance of developed countries in support of developing countries under the Paris Agreement into context, the experience to date is telling. At COP 21 in 2015, when the Paris Agreement was agreed, the Paris Agreement Parties set a “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) of US$ 100 billion per year for developed countries to mobilise collectively prior to 2025, to “assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation“.⁸ This extended a previous target to deliver US$ 100 billion by 2020, set in 2009. The Global Stocktake Decision noted “with deep regret ” that the US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 goal had not been met in 2021 and invited developed Paris Agreement Parties to “fully deliver, with urgency” the target amount by 2025.⁹

COP29 – the finance COP

At COP 29, all eyes were therefore set on how the revised NCQG would deliver, on behalf of the developed countries, their commitments under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.

The decision¹⁰ (the Baku NCQG Decision) set a goal “of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action” and called for all actors to help scale up financing for developing country Parties “from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion by 2035.“¹¹

Given the same decision states that the costed needs reported in NDCs “of developing country Parties are USD 5.1-6.8 trillion up till 2030” (which is not as much as the amount required for a 1.5 degree target, given the lack of NDC ambition outlined above), the revised NCQG was clearly a drop in the proverbial ocean in terms of the actual financing needs of the developing country Parties.

The Baku NCQG Decision recognises that public sector financing has limited capacity and that without the private sector getting involved in the climate action needed in developing countries, there is no way the objectives of the Paris Agreement can be achieved. In fact, the decision does not invite a further assessment of the adequacy of the revised NCQG until 2030 (i.e. at COP35).¹²

As the Financial Times reported on the Baku NCQG Decision – “To a large extent, the divide here is between the 24 developed countries that are obliged to contribute international climate finance, and everyone else.”¹³ Whilst there were a lot of divisions between the developed countries and everyone else, the revised NCQG crystallises the simple truth – that the developed countries have neither the financial capacity nor the political willingness to deliver the financing needed to address the key Paris Agreement goals.

Progress on the UAE Dialogue was not expected to be fast given that the answer to how to deliver on the Global Stocktake does not have to be resolved until COP33. Although a decision was reached at COP29 on the progress of the UAE Dialogue, none of it is substantive beyond stating the obvious around the importance of scaling up the need for finance.

A divergence between ambition and reality 

There have been reports highlighting that by June 2024, we had already achieved twelve months in a row with global mean surface temperatures at least 1.5 °C above pre-industrial conditions.¹⁴ Given the 1.5 degree target is a long-term goal, a single year warmer than 1.5 °C does not mean that the long-term goal has been exceeded. We may not know whether it has until a significant period of time passes, to allow for the necessary backward-looking averaging exercise. However, by the time we can do that, it may well be too late to achieve the target. As another report puts it, “A year above 1.5 °C signals that Earth is most probably within the 20-year period that will reach the Paris Agreement limit“¹⁵.

There is clearly an urgency in the science and data being reported which is not necessarily reflected in the actions of the Paris Agreement Parties. The collective NDC ambitions are already too low based on the rapid emission reduction requirements highlighted by the Global Stocktake Decision. The assumption is that the Global North countries can fund their own emission reductions and that Article 9 under the Paris Agreement is now the primary means by which to support the ambitions of the Global South. However, the revised NCQGs under the Baku NCQG Decision are hardly likely to move the needle, given the climate financing track record of the Global North countries.

The Paris Agreement has only a single mechanism by which it can involve the private sector in the process of moving climate finance from the Global North to the Global South. This is under the Article 6 mechanism which has finally been made fully operational, at least on paper. The reality is that the biggest countries are not committing to the purchase of Article 6 units. To date, the limited demand for Article 6 units has mostly come from Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Switzerland, with the UK and EU refusing to use them as part of their NDC compliance. The US does not even count in this context anymore, as it is a precondition for participation in Article 6 that the party is a signatory to the Paris Agreement.

Whereas there was some optimism in 2016 that the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement would be a one-off event, there is little reason to be optimistic after this second withdrawal. It is hugely significant in terms of carbon dioxide emissions: in 2023 the US was the second biggest emitter after China¹⁶ and in the league tables of cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion worldwide from 1750 to 2023 by major country, the US retains the top spot, accounting for “roughly a quarter of all historical CO₂ produced from fossil fuels and industry“.¹⁷

Without active emission reduction efforts by the US, the 1.5 degree target is only achievable if other countries overachieve on their NDCs or increase their own NDC ambitions to compensate for the US share of emissions. Further, by withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, the US is abdicating its financial responsibility linked to the historic contribution it has made to global warming. It will not be contributing to the already meagre funding obligations of the developing countries under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, or to any alternative developed under the UAE Dialogue. Countries such as Argentina and Indonesia have queried why they should take on NDC obligations when the US is not doing so.

With inadequate collective NDC ambitions and insufficient funding to support the Global South’s own energy transition needs, this clearly raises the question whether the 1.5 degree target is achievable. The extremely optimistic view would be “maybe,” but more realistically, it is doubtful.

The role of the Paris Agreement going forward

What is the role of the Paris Agreement in light of these challenges? The answer is that it remains the main tool available to help galvanise global collective action to address a global environmental problem. Abandoning the Paris Agreement, as we abandoned the Kyoto Protocol, is not an option. The lesson learnt from not continuing with the Kyoto Protocol, is that we lost 10 years of action on the back of a promise of a more inclusive framework. We cannot afford another 10 years of inaction in an attempt to create a different framework. We must keep using what we have, but use it better.

If we cannot achieve the 1.5 degree target, we must recalibrate our objectives to the 2 degree target. At present, that too appears unlikely based on current NDC ambition levels. According to the UN Environment Programme’s (UNEP) 2024 Emissions Gap Report¹⁸, we are on course for a temperature increase of 2.6-3.1°C over the course of this century unless NDC ambition levels are significantly increased. The deadline for Paris Agreement Parties to publish their next series of NDC targets for 2035 recently lapsed with most of the largest emitters failing to submit their new NDCs.

There is a separate challenge for those countries which remain committed to the Paris Agreement and take on ambitious NDC targets, namely the free ride that the US will take by not contributing to the collective objectives of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement has no teeth to penalise the US. Those countries which trade with countries that are not part of the Paris Agreement must consider how to leverage their trade relations, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, so as to extract compensation. Policy and legislative tools, such as the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, may become necessary to address the mismatch in climate commitments and the costs of decarbonisation borne by the countries committed to the Paris Agreement.

Adaptation alongside mitigation?

The logical conclusion from this is that whilst mitigation action is increasingly important and urgent and must be accelerated, it would be foolish for us to not increase our efforts to prepare for a world where there may be a temperature increase of greater than 2 degrees Celsius. This reality forces us to examine what the state of play for adaptation finance is and whether it is fit for its purpose. We shall do so in the second part of this paper, to follow.

Conclusions

The Paris Agreement recognises that not all Paris Agreement Parties have the same climate change commitments. The principle, set out in Article 4 of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in light of different national circumstances, means that developed countries should pursue a 1.5 degree net zero target but, where climate finance is not made available to other countries, they are likely only to follow a 2 degree net zero target. Where this is the case, the NDC ambitions of the Paris Agreement Parties are highly likely to lead to a two-speed approach regarding when net zero should be achieved. This will create a tension between the 1.5 degree net zero countries, those aiming for the 2 degree target, aiming for net zero in 2070, and those countries which pull out from the Paris Agreement altogether.

Such tensions will spill over into trading relationships, where 1.5 degree countries will attempt to address carbon leakage concerns by imposing their abatement costs on countries adopting a 2 degree or no net zero approach. The solution for the former is simpler – provide the climate finance that is needed to raise their ambition. The solution to the latter is far more complicated, as highlighted by current trade tensions across the Atlantic.

Footnote

1. Decision [x]/CMA.5
2. At Paragraph 28 of the Global Stocktake Decision
3. With no or limited overshoot
4. Against a 2019 baseline
5. cma2024_10_adv.pdf at paragraph 145
6. At Paragraph 67 of the Global Stocktake Decision
7. At COP 29, these number were revised upwards to US$ 5.1-6.8 trillion till 2030
8. Paragraph 53 of Decision C1/CP.21
9. At Paragraphs 80 and 85 of the Global Stocktake Decision
10. New collective quantified goal on climate finance’, Decision [ ]/CMA.6
11. See paragraph 8 of the Baku NCQG Decision
12. See paragraph 34 of the Baku NCQG Decision
13. ‘COP29 struggles to break climate finance deadlock’, The Financial Times 22 November 2024
14. See the Copernicus Climate Change Service report at Copernicus: June 2024 Marks 12th Month of Global Temperature Reaching 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial and the Berkeley Earth temperature update at Berkely Earth June 2024 Temperature Update
15. Bevacqua, E., Schleussner, CF. & Zscheischler, J. ‘A year above 1.5 °C signals that Earth is most probably within the 20-year period that will reach the Paris Agreement limit’. Nat. Clim. Chang. (2025). Bevacqua A Year Above 1.5c signals
16. Global CO₂ emissions by country 2023 | Statista
17. Cumulative CO₂ emissions by country 1750-2023 | Statista
18. Emissions Gap Report 2024 | UNEP – UN Environment Programme